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PREFACE
This report brings together in one source the details to date of a
program at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to improve the effectiveness of
small arms fire at short ranges when quick reaction is required. The program
encompasses both developmental and field-testing activities. This particular
type of fire has been referred to as pointing fire and quick fire. The need
to improve this type of fire was brought to the attention of the author at the
ARPA Summer Conference on Small Arms held at the Stanford Research Institute
in 1970. There, as documented in the report on the conference, the author
conceived the idea of a sight to bracket the target, rather than aligning a
weapon on the target, as the means to improve pointing fire.
Such a sight was subsequently created with the participation of Captain
William G. Kemple, USMC, a student in the Operations Analysis Curriculum, and
Mr. Kenneth Mothersell, shop manager of the Mechanical Engineering Laboratory,
NPS. Captain Kemple determined what the general dimensions and configuration
of bracketing sights of two sizes should be for the M16A1 rifle. Mr. Mothersell
designed and made the prototype. Captain Kemple, with the help of Lieutenant
John W. McKinney, USN, conducted the first field test of the bracketing-sight
concept as their dual -master's thesis project. The experiment was made possible
by the help and cooperation of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Experimentation
Command (USACDEC), Fort Ord, California. Major F. A. Isgrig, MSC, the center's
human factors officer, was especially helpful, not only for his aid in obtaining
the logistic resources necessary for the experiment, but for his ideas in
formulating, preparing for, and conducting the experiment. The weapons, ammuni-
tion, range personnel, and experimental subjects were provided by USACDEC. The
range, targets, and target mechanisms were provided by the Infantry Training
Center, Fort Ord. The instrumentation package was designed and created by
Mr. Paul Sparks, laboratory technician in the Man-Machine Systems Design
Laboratory, NPS. A detailed report of this stationary target experiment is
given in the thesis by Captain Kemple and Lieutenant McKinney (1971).
The second field test of the bracketing-sight concept was conducted by
Captain George A. Fisher, Jr., Infantry, and Captain Frank R. McLeskey, Signal
Corps, of the U.S. Army as their dual-thesis project in the Operations Analysis
Curriculum. A full report of the experiment is contained in their thesis
(Fisher and McLeskey, 1972). This experiment was conducted against a moving
personnel target on USACDEC's moving-target range at the Hunter-Ligget Military
Reservation, Jolon, California. Again, the test could not have been conducted
without the superb support provided by USACDEC. This support included the
sophisticated range and target mechanisms, range instrumentation, technical
support personnel, range personnel, experimental subjects, weapons, and
ammunition.
A third field test was conducted by Major Robert A. Miller, Infantry,
U.S. Army. The bracketing sight was used to fire the M16A1 from a moving
vehicle--a jeep with a mock-up of a MICV (mechanized infantry combat vehicle)
firing port. The results of this experiment are not reported here, since they
pertained more to the problem of firing from a moving vehicle rather than the
sights, themselves. Owing to several factors— the most important of which
were the inherent instability of the jeep and the extremely bad weather that
caused the firing track to deteriorate markedly--short-burst, automatic fire
was required and yet, the overall hit percent was too low to provide any statis-
tically reliable evaluation of the bracketing-sight concept. The small bracketing
sight did score the most hits, and it was preferred by the test subjects.
Details of the experiment can be found in Major Miller's (1973) thesis. The
test was conducted at Fort Ord, which provided the range facilities. All
other resources were, again, provided by USACDEC.
The development and test program was then shifted to the riot gun
(shotgun) for two reasons. Since, almost by definition, use of the riot gun
involves pointing and quick fire, it was felt that the bracketing-sight con-
cept should help in this case, too, to increase the effectiveness of fire.
It was also appropriate to study the riot gun in the context of the previous
experiments with the bracketing sight on rifles, since it has often been the
weapon of choice for patrols or the point in jungle warfare. Another, and
equally important reason for going to the riot gun was the growing apprecia-
tion of a need for nonlethal weapons in law-enforcement and the control of
civil disturbances. One aspect of this need, as brought out in a conference
sponsored by the National Research Council, was to make existing weapons less
lethal. Obviously, the riot gun was a prime candidate. While other researchers
have sought ammunition changes to accomplish this, it seemed quite possible to
reduce unwanted and inadvertent casualties by providing the fi rer a bracketing
sight that would show him all persons in the cone of fire. Results of this
program, conducted with Captain Richard D. Read, Signal Corps, U.S. Army, will
be reported later.
Finally, the author wishes to express his deep appreciation for the work
done by these marvelous officers who have taken part in the program. Their
enthusiasm, great effort, and professional skill--in both their military and
academic fields--were inspirational. While a great amount of help was provided,
especially by USACDEC, the experiments mentioned above were actually conducted
on a "shoestring" basis with respect to the personnel and manhours actually
expended on the experiments. That is, one or two officers—with their thesis
adviser—designed, fielded, and analyzed complex livefire tests that normally
would require a team of military personnel and their scientific counterparts
working over a considerable period of time. These facts would seem to lend
strong vindication to a program of graduate education for military officers
that gives them the opportunity to act in such capacities. Attention should
be called to the fact that officers from three different services—U.S. Marine
Corps, U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Army have participated in the program. This
could not have taken place at any other institution of advanced learning. It
demonstrates the unique role of the Naval Postgraduate School in providing
quality education to military officers that is relevant to their future careers.
It is indeed exciting and always challenging to be a part of this picture.
Additionally, this development and testing program should provide valuable
information to the civilian as well as the military community.
J.K.A.
10 November 1974
IMPROVEMENT OF SMALL ARMS POINTING FIRE USING BRACKETING SIGHTS:
A FIELD EXPERIMENT PROGRAM
BRIEF
The problem investigated was to improve the effectiveness and hit
probabilities of small arms fire at short range using pointing fire. A
bracketing sight was designed and evaluated in a program of four field experi-
ments. Two of the experiments are reported in detail. The need to improve
quick reaction, short-range fire has been amply demonstrated in many military
settings, but particularly in jungle warfare. A similar need has been demon-
strated in civil law enforcement. In the latter case, there is also the
requirement to make fire as discrete as possible to prevent unwanted casual-
ties. An activity analysis of this type of fire suggested that a sight that
would aid the firer in quickly acquiring his target might improve the accuracy
and quickness of fire. A circular sight that would bracket the target was
designed and mounted on the front sight of an M16A1 rifle. A large and small
sight were designed since it was not known what size would be optimum. In a
stationary target experiment, 10 trained riflemen fired single shot at pop-up
targets that appeared for 1.6 sees, at ranges of 25 and 50 yds. They used
weapons with the standard sight (control) and the two bracketing sights. Sig-
nificant effects were found for sights (p < .05) and for ranges (p < .001).
The small bracketing sight was found to be better than the other two. It was
better by 31 percent at 50 yds. and 19 percent at 25 yds. when compared with
the standard sight using Army quick-fire doctrine. In a field experiment using
moving targets, 12 trained riflemen fired at a popup silhouette target that
appeared for 2.5 sees, while moving laterally at 6 mph. at ranges of 25 and
50 yds. The three sight conditions were as before. The small and large
bracketing sights were significantly better than the control sight (p < .001)
While the two bracketing sights did not differ statistically, the larger
bracketing sight achieved the most hits and was better by 118 percent at 25
yds. and by 275 percent at 50 yds. over the standard sight. The results
showed that a sight aid, such as the bracketing sights, could improve short-
range, quick fire markedly. The degree of improvement was greater as the
task became more difficult. Since the bracketing sight was easy to use, it
should be an aid in training. There remained the problems of determining the
optimum size and the size requirements when fire with greater dispersion is
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1. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES.
The need to use small arms effectively and quickly at short ranges has
grown rapidly in recent years. This need was dramatically emphasized in the
wars in Southeast Asia where face-to-face military encounters frequently took
place at ranges under 50 m. because of the dense foliage in the region and
the tactics that emphasized infiltration, surprise, and ambush. The need to
employ small arms in this fashion, along with similar tactics, has also appeared
in many nonmilitary contexts and, often, just as dramatically. These have
included civil disturbances, highjackings, armed crimes, and prison revolts.
The use of small arms in the civil sector has had an added dimension.
There is the very grave requirement to prevent unwanted casualties. This
requirement makes the situation very difficult because there is a positive
relationship between the dispersion pattern of fire and the ability to hit a
point target. The military user of small arms can optimize what is, essentially,
a built-in error in his system to ensure a higher probability of hitting the
target. The law-enforcement user, on the other hand, must employ \/ery discrete
fire, and he cannot make indiscriminate use of dispersion in aimed fire to
attain the desired target hits.
A source of problems that is common to both the military and civilian
user of small arms is the fact that they have not been designed for the short-
range, quick fire role. This role frequently requires that the weapon be
pointed, rather than aimed. But weapons have been designed for the hunter,
soldier, and marksman who uses deliberate, aimed fire. Accordingly, real
differences can be demonstrated in the effectiveness of pointing fire by
simple changes to existing designs (Kramer and Torre, 1964). The small -arms
user has been disinclined to use such modifications for a variety of reasons,
among which are those of impractical ity, expense, and a fear of degrading
aimed fire as a result of the modifications. But probably, the greatest
impediment to change in the systems lies in the nature of those who are experts
in the design and use of small arms. They feel very reluctant to give up the
many years of craftsmanship, skill, and tradition that have gone into the design
and fabrication of weapons and the modes of fire that are used in keenly fought,
competitive situations.
One answer attempted by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps to the problem of
attaining effective, quick, pointing fire was a deliberate attempt to develop
skill in pointing fire. They based their training on the skills exhibited by
trick-shot experts and the recommendations of these extremely skillful firers.
Originally termed "quick kill," but later changed to the "quick fire" method,
the emphasis was placed on firing with both eyes open, not using the sights,
looking well over the top of the sights, and pointing the rifle. Air rifles,
highly miniaturized targets, and hand-thrown discs were incorporated into the
training program. The program had considerable face validity and a good sales
effort, but very little hard evidence as to its effectiveness for the individual
soldier.
The objective of the research reported in this paper was to enhance the
effectiveness of pointing fire. The approach to this objective used three
steps: (1) an analysis of the quick-fire situation with a human activity
orientation, (2) derivation of solutions to the man-weapon problems identified,
and (3) field tests of the proposed solutions.
2. ANALYSIS OF SHORT-RANGE, QUICK-FIRE SITUATIONS.
2.1. Situational Demands.
In the extreme, although not uncommon, case the quick-fire situation
is one in which the fi rer is faced with a kill or be-killed situation. An-
other type of situation requires the fi rer to shoot in a very short, discrete
time period or "window." The situation might be considered as one of "hit
fast or miss your opportunity." In the civil context, such situations might
arise when there is a need to surprise the intended target or when the target
person momentarily relaxes his vigil over his hostage. A very discrete, psycho-
logical time period might be involved when one fires in a civil disturbance to
frighten or warn the group to be controlled. Generally, then, the short-range,
quick-fire situation places a yery high demand on the time to the first hit.
As previously stated, the range is short, the target is another individual, and,
in the civil context, there should be no unintended victims.
2.2. Psychological Factors.
2.2.1. Visual Factors.
The demands of the short-range, quick-fire situation are reflected in
the firer, first and foremost, by his need to maintain constant visual contact
with the threat. This, in turn, will be reflected behavioral ly in the firer
by his keeping both eyes open and maintaining visual focus at infinity. Keeping
both eyes open means that he will be pointing his weapon binocularly. Truly
binocular pointing (sighting) only occurs, however, when the individual's
point of reference is equidistant between his two eyes. That is, he should
be using his so-called "Cyclops" eye. Unfortunately, the experimental litera-
ture is quite equivocal as to whether individuals ever use the Cyclops eye or,
if they do, under what circumstances. For example, it may well be that a well-
trained individual is using his Cyclops eye when he fires a revolver using
two hands, two eyes, and facing his target squarely. In this example, the
firer's focus is on the target and the weapon is placed directly in line with
the Cyclops eye. If he were to close his right eye, he would notice that the
revolver is aimed to the right of the target. If he were to close his left
eye, the aiming point of the revolver would jump a similar distance to the
left of the target.
With a longer barrel and stock, characteristic of rifles and other
shoulder-fired weapons, it is not practical to fire in such a manner. As a
result, the weapon is brought to the right or left shoulder and normally
sighted with the right or left eye. Many trained marksmen fire with both
eyes open while sighting with one eye. But in this case, they are making use
of the sights provided on the weapon. When a person is told to look over the
top of the sights and point the weapon instead of aiming it, he may be using
his right or left eye or he may be using his Cyclops eye to align the weapon
with the target. The infantry training literature was cognizant of these
possibilities and provided instructions to the trainer for determining the
dominant eye of the firer when he was consistently biased in his aiming point.
Presumably, his dominant eye took over the sighting when he fired with both
eyes open. If the dominant eye was opposite to the side he was firing from,
the bias resulted. For example, if the shot-group center tended to occur to
the left of the target when firing right-handed with both eyes open, the
person's left eye was said to be doing the sighting. Accordingly, there is
the possibility of a sighting dominance conflict when firing with both eyes
open in a stressful situation. The modifications previously referred to to
make military rifles better pointing weapons included such devices as a sighting
bar connecting the front and rear sights to facilitate alignment of the weapon
with the target.
If the individual maintains his focus at infinity in the quick-fire
situation because he needs to maintain continuous visual surveillance of his
target, it is obvious that he cannot use the sights on the weapon properly,
since they are less than an infinite distance from his eye. This is particu-
larly true of the rear sight. Accordingly, the several newer sights under
development that require the firer to use a rear sight or look at an objective
field near his sighting eye will not aid him in the quick-fire situation.
There is also another reason why sights near the eye cannot be used in this
situation. The reason is this: It has been found and confirmed in many
experiments that the pupillary reflex is responsive to psychological as well
as light stimulation. When a person is highly aroused or excited, his pupils
will open widely. No doubt, this reflex had survival value in that letting
in large amounts of light to the eye ensured that danger signals in the
environment would not pass unnoticed. Unfortunately, near focus is severely
degraded when the pupils are enlarged. Anyone who has had eyes bathed in
atropine for ophthalmologic examination will immediately attest to this
phenomenon. So here is another reason why conventional or some developmental
sights will not aid much in the quick fire situation. The general conclusion
to be made in this area of analysis is that sights which require a near focus
of the eyes will not be of use to an individual in the quick-fire situation.
While this may or may not be the original basis, the quick-fire principle
of not using the sights but looking over the top of them appears to be justified
for current weapons.
2.2.2. Perceptual -Motor Factors.
When time to the first hit is of paramount importance, very rapid
acquisition of the target is a necessity. If the weapon is already at the
shoulder, it must be slewed to where it is pointing at the target. If the
weapon is held at port arms, bringing the weapon to the shoulder and pointing
it at the target may be accomplished in a more-or-less, single movement. How-
ever, final adjustment using a smaller slewing movement will be required to
acquire the target properly. Thus, taking the shoulder as a point of reference,
the muzzle end of the weapon must be slewed to where it is pointing directly
at the target. This, then, is the simple, but all-important process of target
acquisition in the quick-fire situation.
As simple as the movement may be, closer examination reveals some compli-
cating factors. First, it is not often realized that the target in quick-fire
situations is very large when compared against the built-in accuracy of the
weapon and the aiming accuracy that is possible for the operator of the weapon.
At 200 m. on a known-distance range, the root mean square (RMS) error of a group
of firers will be less than 1 mil, even when relatively inexperienced firers
are used (Saul and Jaffe, 1955). A very important reason why this is possible
is the fact that the bullseye at that range is slightly over 1 mil. With
plenty of time, careful aiming, and gentle "squeezing off" of the rounds, it
is possible to place many shots within the bull itself. On the other hand,
taking a man to be 50 cm. wide when viewed head on, he will present a target
that is 10 mils wide at 50 m. and 20 mils wide at 25 m. Even with the require-
ment for speed of fire, why is it so difficult to hit such a large target at
short ranges?
The answer apparently lies in the fact that the weapon, its sights,
and the training doctrine are optimized for discrete, small, aiming points.
Thus, the larger and more amorphous a target becomes, the larger will be the
aiming error of the fi rer. Stated in another way, the basic concept in
acquiring a target is to align the weapon with a wery small, distinct point.
This, of course, is incorporated in the doctrine of obtaining a proper sight
picture when firing. This doctrine is not only useless, but it may even
become a hazard in the quick-fire situation if the fi rer tries to apply it
unconsciously. This may occur in two ways. First, he may lose some precious
time in searching for an aiming point within this large target. Second, he
may not find a point at which to aim with the result that he shoots more-or-
less randomly in the general direction of the target. Here again, these
factors could be cited to justify the quick-fire doctrine of not using the
sights and looking over the top of them.
2.3. Performance Trends.
The results of three field experiments provide empirical verification
of the ideas expressed in paragraph 2.2., above. The first experiment by
Sterne and Yudowitch (1955) used one team of seven "proficient" shooters and
another team of seven "regular" shooters who had just completed basic training.
They fired as a team at a row of seven pop-up targets that appeared individually
at random intervals for a constant period of time. The exposure times were
varied during the course of the experiment, but they were constant, announced,
and demonstrated before a particular firing run. The row of targets was 40
yards (36.58 m.) from the firing line. The targets were circular (28 in. in
diameter) (71 .12 cm.) with a black bullseye in the center. Each member of the
team fired exactly one round at each target as it appeared in view. He used
conventional sighting doctrine and fired from a standing position.
The other two experiments (Kramer and Torre, 1964; Torre, et al
.
, 1964)
were quite similar to each other and conducted by the U.S. Army Human Engineer-
ing Laboratories (HEL). Silhouette targets were placed at three ranges, and
they appeared individually at random intervals for approximately 2-3 sees.
The ranges in the Kramer and Torre experiment were 20, 40, and 60 meters;
those in the Torre, et al. experiment were 40, 60, and 80 meters. Infantry
soldiers were used as subjects. They were instructed to use pointing fire
and to fire as rapidly as they could. The Sterne and Yudowitch experiment
used the Ml rifle and the M14 carbine. The Kramer and Torre experiment used
the M14 carbine (for the data reported here), and the Torre, et al . experiment
used the Stoner rifle with ball ammunition (for the data reported here). Only
data from semiautomatic fire are used here.
One comparison that is meaningful is that at 40 yards or 40 m. in these
experiments, since the ranges are comparable. Using the trials for both pro-
ficient and regular shooters and combining the Ml and M14 results, an aiming
error (RMS) of 3.3 mils was obtained for the Sterne and Yudowitch experiment
when the targets appeared for 8 sec. On the other hand, aiming errors were
13.3 and 15.0 mils for the M14 and Stoner weapons, respectively, in the other
two experiments, where the target exposure time was approximately 2 sec. While
the conditions were quite different between the Sterne and Yudowitch and the
HEL experiments, the results are unambiguous. Under more ideal conditions--
aimed fire with ample time to fire and circular targets with bullseyes--the
aiming error is less by a factor of 4. The aiming error in the Sterne and
Yudowitch experiment at a target-presentation time of 2 sec. (comparable to
the HEL experiments) was 7.5 mils, which is about half of that of the HEL
experiments. When the Sterne and Yudowitch results at 2 sec. are examined in
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more detail, they show (for the M14 carbine only) that the error was 3.5 mils
for the proficient firers and 16.2 mils for the "regulars." The difference
can be attributed to the fact that, at this target-exposure time, the profi-
cient firers were able to aim their shots, while the regulars were not. All
firers agreed that only pointing fire was possible at the 1 sec. exposure
period, which was also used in the Sterne and Yudowitch experiment. Finally,
combining data from the two experiments where necessary, the HEL experiments
showed the aiming error (in mils) to be 14.2 at 20 m., 13.1 at 40 m., 10.4 at
60 m., and 9.3 at 80 m. Thus, for the same target, aiming errors become
smaller as the range increases.
The conclusions to be made from these experimental comparisons is that
aiming error is small when aimed fire is used. When the target presents a
convenient point for its acquisition, such as a bullseye, aimed fire can be
used by proficient firers at a target-exposure period as short as 2 sec. under
range conditions. Under conditions requiring pointing fire, the dispersion




It is obvious from the preceding analysis that the average soldier needs
an appropriate sight and firing doctrine to enable him to improve his quick-
fire. The sight should emphasize rapid target acquisition, and not precise
aiming. It should enable the firer to keep his eyes on the target while
acquiring it in his sights, be far enough away from his eye so that it will be
in focus, and it should provide some aid to aiming which is critically missing
in the quick- fire technique.
3. DESIGN OF A CIRCULAR, BRACKETING SIGHT.
3.1. General Considerations.
The basic concept in designing an appropriate sight was to reverse the
existing arrangement of rifle sights. That is, the rear sight was to be the
post and front sight, a relatively large bracket. The reasoning for this
arrangement was as follows. The rear peep sight on a military rifle or carbine,
for example, serves to limit the visual field severely and provide a frame of
reference for centering the front sight. This, in turn, enables the position-
ing of the front sight on an aiming point so that the weapon is aligned to
that point. This permits a yery high degree of precision in aiming for the
skilled marksman. In principle, it assumes that the target has been acquired
or that target acquisition is not a problem--the problem is precise aiming.
The reverse arrangement provides a reference or base point at the rear post
and the bracket at the far end of the rifle is slewed until it frames the
target. When the target and the rear post are in the center of the bracket,
it has been fully acquired for firing. What the concept looses in precision,
it certainly makes up in the rapidity of acquiring the target, which is the
primary requisite in quick fire. The major difference is that with the con-
ventional method, the weapon must be placed on a small point within the target.
With the reverse arrangement, the entire target is centered in a relatively
large frame. A sight picture is still possible, but it is a completely differ-
ent sight picture that is especially appropriate for quick fire. In concept,
it is like the old press camera that permitted the use of a wire bracket for
quickly framing action shots.
Given the concept of a bracketing sight, there were still some general
questions to be answered. These concerned, primarily, the shape and size of
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the forward bracketing element. With respect to shape, a triangular or
diamond-shaped bracket could provide a good aiming aid in that one could draw
imaginary cross-hairs from the corners and easily provide a central reference
point. But this would stress aiming, and acquisition would not be optimum
because the area within the bracketing sight would be small considering the
maximum vertical and horizontal dimensions. A U-shaped bracket would be
analogous to the square bracket on the press camera, but it would be unwieldy
and a poor aid for aiming--i.e. centering the target would be difficult. A
circular bracket seemed to be the best because it was efficient with respect
to space, it would provide a central reference without stressing conscious
aiming, and it would be compatible with the natural visual field, which is
circular with a central point of maximum clarity.
With respect to size, the front sight had to be large enough to bracket
a typical personnel target at a typical range. The larger the sight, the
easier it would be to bring the target into the sight picture but the greater
would be the loss in aiming precision. Also, a larger sight would be better
for a moving target; a smaller sight, better for a stationary target. The
reasoning behind this was that a moving target would be more difficult to
acquire in the sight and that once the target was acquired there should be
room within the sight to lead it.
Another consideration was the thickness of the material making up the
bracket. It had to provide a frame of reference around the target, and yet
it could not obstruct a view of the target. The thickness of the material
would aviso make a difference in firing under conditions of limited visibility.
That is, it would have to be thicker to be useful under such conditions.
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A final consideration was that it would be desirable to have a quick-
fire sighting arrangement that would not interfere with or degrade the use of
the regular sights for aimed fire. Ideally, the sight configuration would be
one that could be folded flat against the muzzle when its use was not antici-
pated and could be placed into its quick-fire role with a minimum of effort.
3.2. Detailed Specifications.
The M16A1 rifle was selected as the weapon for the design and test of
an experimental bracketing sight because of its availability for test firing
and because it was known to be a weapon with poor pointing characteristics.
Selection of this weapon, with its high rear sight, made the design problem
one of creating a circular frame around the front sight. Since it was not
feasible to select or analytically calculate an optimum size, circular sights
with two diameters were designed. The smaller sight was designed to encompass
the breadth of three average men at a distance of 25 yards (22.86 m.), and the
larger frame, to encompass six men at that distance. The point of attachment
(front sight) was taken to be 18 in. (45.72 cm.) from the eye and a man's width,
20 in. (50.8 cm.). Thus, the sights enclosed an area of 67 mils and 133 mils
at 25 yards. The actual diameter of the aperture of the small and large sights
was 1.32 in. (3.35 cm.) and 2.64 in. (6.70 cm.), respectively. The width of
the ring metal as viewed by the firer was 1/8 in. (3.18 mm.).
The entire bracketing sight, made in three pieces, is shown in Figures 1
and 2 attached to the front sight of the M16A1 rifle. There was a clasp that
fitted snugly on the forward upright of the front sight. A bracketing sight
mounting piece was then screwed onto the clasp. The mounting piece had a long
vertical slit which permitted the vertical adjustment of the bracketing sight
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mm
Figure 2. Front View of 1.32" dia. Experimental Bracketinq
Sight on M16A1 Rifle.
14
itself, which can be clearly seen in Figure 2. It was affixed to the mounting
piece with the aforementioned knurled screw and a pin to prevent rotation of
the sight around the adjustable screw. The large bracketing sight was exactly
the same as the small sight shown in these figures, except for the diameter
of the sight opening, which was twice as large, and is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3 also shows the two countersunk screws by which the mounting piece
was attached to the clasp. Figure 4 shows a side view of a soldier with the
small bracketing sight in firing position.
3.3. Firing Doctrine with the Bracketing Sights.
The doctrine that was used in the experiments to be described, when
firing with the sight-modified M16A1, was as follows. The body position, the
manner of bringing the weapon to the shoulder from high port arms and obtaining
a firm stock weld, and the instinctive pointing of the weapon were all adopted
from the doctrine for the quick-fire technique. The only difference was that
the firer was instructed to close one eye and look through the sights until
the target was bracketed in the circular frame.
15
Figure 3. Front View of 2.64" dia Experimental Bracketing
Sight on M16A1 Rifle.
16
Figure 4. Side View of Soldier with Small Circular Sight
in Firing Position.
17
4. EXPERIMENTAL TEST AND EVALUATION.
4.1. Stationary Target Experiment.
4.1.1. Purpose.
The purpose of this experiment was to evaluate the effectiveness of
quick-fire against stationary targets utilizing conventional quick-fire doctrine
and the large and small bracketing sights. Since this was the first experiment,
it was necessary to make the evaluation simple and clear-cut so that attribu-
tion of the findings could be unequivocably made to the three firing techniques.
4.1.2. Subjects.
The 10 test subjects (Ss) were infantry enlisted men from the U.S. Army
Combat Developments Command Experimentation Battalion stationed at Fort Ord,
California. All Ss had an infantry military occupational specialty and had
received formal quick-fire training in the past. Seven had experience in Vietnam.
4.1.3. Facilities.
The experiment was conducted on the beach ranges at Fort Ord. The range
for the experiment was set up between two berms of a known-distance range. The
layout of the range is shown in Figure 5. The components of the range were
four pop-up targets, a single firing station, and a control station. The four
targets were placed so that two were on an arc 25 yards (22.86 m.) and the
other two on an arc 50 yards (45.72 m.) from the firing station. The two tar-
gets at each range were placed so that they were 10° to the right and left of
the firing station—that is, they subtended an angle of 20° for a firer at the
firing station. The firing station was on the same level as the targets and
was merely marked to show where the firer was to stand. The control station
was located on a berm approximately 10 feet (3.048 m.) above the level of the
range and the firing station. The area between the berms was flat and level















Figure 5. Layout of the Range for the Stationary Target Experiment.
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The targets were U.S. Army, E-type, polyethylene silhouettes measuring
40.25 in. (102.235 cm.) high and 19.5 in. (49.53 cm.) in breadth. They were
mounted on U.S. Army, target-control mechanisms (M31A1) to provide timed
target exposures and to initiate the hit-indicator circuit. The control
mechanisms were dug in and sand-bagged which resulted in a masking of about
1 ft. (30.48 cm.) of the lower portion of a target when it was exposed. The
sand-bagging also helped to prevent premature cuing of which target was to
appear by masking the target completely when it was in the flat position, and
it also helped to prevent tardy hits as the target was going down.
A small control console was placed at the control station to permit
manual selection of the targets for exposure and to indicate hits on a target
by the flashing of two fluorescent bulbs. The command to the target went
through an interval timer which raised the selected target for 1.6 seconds.
4.1.4. Experimental Design.
The experimental design was a repeated measures design with each S_
firing under all conditions. The independent variables were the three weapon
configurations (to be referred to as the "sights" variable), two target ranges,
two target directions (right and left of the firer), and the 10 S_s.
4.1.5. Procedure.
Prior to actual test firing, the S_s were given approximately two hours
of training. A short, refresher lecture was given in the prinicples of quick-
fire shooting, followed by brief instructions in the changes in that technique
to be employed with the modified sight configurations. The S_s fired five
rounds with each sight configuration to familiarize themselves with the proper
body-weapon-target alignment and also to permit correction of faulty (nondoc-
trinal) firing techniques. The training was concluded with a complete training
run of the experimental firing conditions.
20
In the actual test firing, one trial consisted of an S firing 20
shots with one sight configuration at the four targets. Each of the targets
appeared 5 times in a random order, with only one appearing at any one time.
The interval between target presentations was short but unspecified. The
order in which a particular S^ fired the three sight configurations and the
order in which he fired were randomized. Only one shot was fired at a single
target presentation. If the S^ failed to fire, a miss was recorded. The S^
was informed verbally whether a hit or miss resulted with each shot. The
dependent measure was the number of hits scored on each target by each shooter
with each sight configuration. Since each of 20 Ss fired 10 shots with each
of three sight configurations, there were 600 data points in all. After com-
pletion of all firing, the Ss completed a questionnaire soliciting their
feelings and preferences about the test firing and the sights.
While the test was simple and formal, the reader should be cognizant
of the features that made it a reasonably valid test of quick-fire. There was
target uncertainty—that is, the S^ did not know exactly when or which target
would appear. The S was under extreme time stress—the targets just "waved."
An additional stress originated from the fact that he fired alone with everyone
else watching and within earshot of the hit or miss feedback provided him.
There were realistic ranges to the targets based on operational data. The S^
was firing on flat, natural ground— not from raised berm to targets on another
raised berm. He received immediate feedback as to the results of his firing.
And the Ss were trained troops who normally used the weapons fired.
4.1.6. Results.
The overall results of the experiment are shown in Table 1. The overall
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and 62 percent at the 25-yard (22.86 m.) range. Over the entire experiment,
the small sight attained a 51.5 percent hit rate; the large sight, 41.5 percent;
and the standard sight, 42.5 percent. The results were subjected to a four-
factorial, randomized block design, analysis of variance. The Ss were consid-
ered as blocks, since each S_ received all combinations of the main variables.
(The data were first transformed using the arcs in transformation, since they
were in the form of proportions.) The only significant effects were those
for sights, F (2, 18) = 4.21, p_ < .05, and for range, F (1, 9) = 31.80,
£ < .001. The main effect for direction of fire was not significant. None of
the interactions of these variables was significant. A Scheffe* multiple com-
parison test was conducted for the sight variable with the result that the
small sight was found to be significantly different from the large bracketing
sight or standard sight with no statistically significant difference between
the latter two sights.
4.1.7. Discussion.
The results show that the small sight was 23 percent better than the
standard, quick-fire procedure over the entire experiment. It was better by
31 percent at 50 yards (45.72 m.) and 19 percent at 25 yards (22.86 m.). Since
there was no significant interaction between sights and distance, these
differences are all reliable. The bracketing sight can considerably enhance
performance in quick-fire situations, but the effect is dependent on the size
of the sight opening. The results also show how severe the inverse relation
between distance and accuracy is at short ranges and how the bracketing sight
can serve to reduce the loss of accuracy with increase in range. These percent-
age differences between the small bracketing sight and the standard procedure
are very large when one considers that differences in the accuracy of small
23
arms are usually difficult to demonstrate. The questionnaire results showed
that the Ss preferred the small sight, with the standard sight second and
the large bracketing sight third. All of the Ss thought that the bracketing
sight was beneficial, and nine of the ten Ss thought it was a valid concept
for improving pointing fire.
4.2. Moving Target Experiment.
4.2.1. Purpose.
The results of the experiment with stationary targets showed that the
bracketing sight could enhance pointing fire under the conditions encountered
in the experiment. A more challenging test would be the case where the target
is moving. Undoubtedly, many targets in the quick-fire environment are moving,
so a test of the bracketing-sight principle against moving targets would help
to validate the principle for practical use in addition to testing it against
the inherent difficulty encountered in moving targets. Several new considera-
tions arise in this situation. It may be that any sight may be detrimental to
pointing the weapon at a moving target. Perhaps it is not possible to improve
on the shotgun with its uncluttered barrel and only vestigial sighting devices,
such as beads. Moving targets, as previously suggested, should require a
different aperture size for the bracketing sight because the target is more
difficult to acquire and because one may want to lead the target after it has
been acquired in the bracket. Another very important consideration is this.
The stationary- target experiment suggested that the bracketing sight was more
of an aid as shooting became more difficul t--i .e. at the greater range. Would
this same trend show up against moving targets? Or does the moving target
present such a difficult task for the average soldier firing a military small
arm that no aid could serve to improve his accuracy? Answers to questions
24
such as these could only be obtained by a livefire test, such as the experiment
to be described.
4.2.2. Subjects.
The Ss were 12 soldiers from the same experimentation battalion of
the U.S. Army Combat Developments Experimentation Command (CDEC) stationed at
Fort Ord, California, that provided the Ss for the preceding experiment. All
had an infantry military occupational specialty and had previously received
quick-fire training. They were all right-handed. Only one of this group had
experience in Vietnam.
4.2.3. Facilities.
The experiment was conducted on the CDEC moving-target range at the
Hunter-Liggett Military Resevation (HLMR), Jolon, California. The range was
laid out in a natural, slightly sloping terrain that was clear from the firing
positions to the target track but wooded behind. The weather was ideal with
the temperature from 50 to 56 degrees (F), essentially no wind, and no precipi-
tation.
The range layout is shown schematically in Figure 6. The components
of the range were a target track, four firing points, a moving target, and
control and power station. The target track was 150 feet (45.72 m.) of alumi-
num rails. An engagement area along the target track was determined to limit
the range fan. The four firing points were located so that two were at a line
25 yards (22.86 m.) from the target track and another two were 50 yards (45.72 m.)
from the track. At each firing line, the two firing positions were designated
right and left firing positions. The control and power stations were located
a short and safe distance away from the end of the track. A view of the range












































































picture are the right and left firing points at the 25 yard (22.86 m.) firing
line. The berm that protected the track and target cart can be seen beyond
the firing line. The track, target cart, raised target, and berm are shown
in Figure 8.
The target was a polyethylene, kneeling (E-type) silhouette that was
30 inches (76.2 cm.) wide and presented a vertical height of approximately 30
inches (76.2 cm.) above the berm when in a raised position (Figure 9). It
was mounted on a modified Army, M13A1 target mechanism which was, in turn,
mounted on a cart. Two on-board batteries provided the power to raise and
lower the target. An electronics package mounted on the cart provided remote
operation of the target mechanism and the sensing of hits. Motive power for
the cart was provided by an industrial Volkswagen engine through a hydraulic
clutch mechanism and cables on two take-up reels that permitted the cart to
run in both directions at controlled speeds. Start-up of the cart was rapid.
The control panel had a tachometer and speedometer to permit control of the
speed of the target. A cart-position, display panel of lights showed where
the cart was in 25 feet (7.62 m.) segments of the track. The cart was run at
a speed of six mph. (9.65 km/hr.) and the target was exposed for 2.5 seconds.
The target dropped when it was hit during the 2.5 second interval. The moving
target system was operated almost continuously for six hours on each of two
test days and made over 700 passes. Only minor problems were encountered.
The operators and standby maintenance and supervisory personnel were provided
by CDEC's Instrumentation Division.
4.2.4. Experimental Design.
The experimental design was a repeated measures design with each S^









































configurations, the two ranges, direction of movement of the target, and the
12 S^s.
4.2.5. Procedure.
Prior to actual test firing, the S^s were given an orientation and
familiarization firing. In the orientation, the Ss were informed of the
problem under investigation, the procedures that would be followed in the test
sequences, and the range safety procedures. They were given an explanation
and weapons demonstration on the techniques they would use for standard quick-
fire and quick-fire with the modified sight configurations. The Ss then
fired five rounds at a stationary target from 25 yards (22.86 m. ) to refresh
their memory on firing procedures and to permit correction of discrepancies.
The target was then allowed to move at 6 mph. (9.65 km/hr.), and each S^
fired 10 rounds to learn to engage the moving target successfully using quick-
fire. Following these procedures, each S^ fired half of the test sequence for
familiarization and to eliminate learning effects in the actual test. A half-
sequence was created by having one-half of the Ss fire from the right position
at 25 yards (22.86 m.) and from the left position at 50 yards (45.72 m.); the
other half of the Ss fired the remaining positions.
The actual test firing was constrained by several considerations that
were time and equipment related. Essentially, it was necessary to run the
target from one side to the other and then back again. On each run of the
round trip, the target had to be engaged. This was the most economic use of
the system. This meant that the S knew from which direction the target would
be approaching but not when it would appear. Time constraints also dictated
that all firing be completed at the 25 yard (22.86 m.) range before firing at
the 50 yard (45.72 m.) range. Ideally, the S should not have been aware of
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the direction of approach of the target, and assignment of firing orders to
the four firing positions should have been random.
The actual test procedure adopted had the Ss firing in a random order
with respect to sight configuration, firing position, and order of firing at
each range. The S^ assigned to the left position fired one round at the
target on its left-to-right run, and the firer at the right position fired one
round at the target on its return run from right-to-left. Each S_ fired at
five target presentations from any one position with a particular sight config-
uration. Accordingly, he fired a total of 60 record runs for the four positions
and three sight configurations. There were 720 data points in total for the
experiment. The dependent measure was the number of targets hit by one S at
each firing position with each weapon configuration.
4.2.6. Results.
The overall results of the experiment are shown in Table 2. The overall
hit rate was 51.5 percent with a hit rate of 66.7 percent at 25 yards (22.86 m.
)
and 36.4 percent at 50 yards (45.72 m.). Over the entire experiment, the small
bracketing sight attained a hit rate of 63.3 percent; the large bracketing
sight, a hit rate of 65.8 percent; and the standard sight and quick-fire tech-
nique, a hit rate of 25.4 percent. As previously, the data in Table 2 were
subjected to a four-factorial, randomized blocks design, analysis of variance
with the Ss considered as blocks. Again, the data were normalized using the
arcsin transformation. The only significant effects were those for sights,
F (2, 22) = 40.53, p_ < .001, and for range, F (1,22) = 46.38, p_ < .001.
The maineffect for direction of target movement was not significant. None of
the interactions of the main effects was significant. A Scheffe multiple com-
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sights to be better than the standard sight with no difference between the
two experimental sights.
4.2.7. Discussion.
Table 3 shows the percent improvement attained over the standard proce-
dure in firing at moving targets when the bracketing sights are used. Statis-
tically, it was shown that these differences are highly significant. As in
the preceding experiment, the deterioration of fire at the greater range is
severe, but the deterioration is greatly ameliorated with the use of the
bracketing-sight principle. Another way of saying the same thing is that the
aid provided by the bracketing sights is, again, greater when the firing situa-
tion is more difficult. In the experiment with stationary targets, the small
sight was better by 29 percent at 25 yards (22.86 m. ) and by 31 percent at 50
yards (45.72 m.). The aid provided at the greater range was 63 percent more
than at the shorter range [ ( 31-19)/19] . In this experiment aid provided by
the large sight at 50 yards (45.72 m.) was 275 percent and at 25 yards (22.86 m.),
118 percent over the hit percent under the standard configuration. The aid
provided at the greater range is 133 percent more than at the shorter range
[(275-118)/118] . Another observation to be made of the results is that the hit
rate was approximately one-third better at 50 yards (45.72 m.) using the bracket-
ing sights than the hit rate at 25 yards (22.86 m.) using the standard config-
uration and quick-fire technique. A final point to note is that, while the
differences were not statistically reliable, the large bracketing sight was at
least equal to the small bracketing sight and probably better. This was sug-
gested as one of the possible findings that the moving-target might reveal.
The questionnaire results again showed that the firers felt that the









small circle 115.0 % 244.0 % 149.0 %
large circle 118.0 % 275.0 % 159.0 %
TABLE 3.
Percent Improvement Using Bracketing Sights
Over the Standard Sight Configuration
For Moving Targets.
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preferred the small sight over the large sight by a margin of 9-to-3, even
though they seemed to do better with the larger sight. The significance of
this statement, beyond its obvious content, is that the firing results are




There can be little doubt that the bracketing sights provided a
significant improvement over the standard configuration and accepted quick-fire
technique. One reason why they proved to be of such a significant aid might
be because the standard, quick-fire techniques are wery poor. But the fact
that the bracketing sights provided even greater advantages as the firing
became more difficult implies that they have an absolute, beneficial effect
of their own. This means that the concept should be further explored to
determine the target and situational parameters that are sensitive to varia-
tions in the size, shape, location, and other configurations of the bracketing
sight. When these relationships are known, it would be possible to design and
optimize a sight that would greatly enhance short-range, quick-reaction fire
using small arms.
5.2. Training Implications.
The experiments showed that proficiency in using the bracketing sights
was easily established. They were meant to be most compatible with the natural
reactions and capabilities of the user, and, indeed, the results bore this out.
The inference can be made from these findings that the bracketing sight would
be most useful in training neophyte firers to acquire and engage fleeting or
moving targets. In fact, appropriately sized, they could be a useful training
aid in learning to fire at a stationary, fixed target. Experimentation in an
actual training situation could confirm and delineate the ways in which the
bracketing sight could prove most helpful in training.
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5.3. Other Applications.
The bracketing sight should be especially effective when an individual
fires multiple missiles against the target that result in a distribution of
hits or shot group. This type of fire would occur with automatic fire and
with shotguns or riot guns. The problem with automatic fire is keeping the
weapon on the target as recoil forces work against the body and tend to dis-
lodge the line of sight. The bracketing sight would serve to help recapture
the target when this happens much more readily than the standard sights. With
the riot gun, the problem is not so much in attaining hits but in preventing
unwanted hits. With 00 buckshot, the spread and lethal range of the pellets
is not fully appreciated until, as demonstrated in two school disturbances in
the South, fatalities occur that stun and surprise those who perpetrate them.
The bracketing sight, appropriately sized, could help to prevent such unfortun-
ate incidents by showing the fi rer all potential targets in the cone of fire.
In both cases, automatic fire and employment of the riot gun, the efficiency
of the fire with respect to the intended target would be greatly improved.
These ideas could also be applied to machineguns and to fire, semiautomatic
or automatic, from moving vehicles such as the newer designs contemplated for
personnel carriers and from airborne platforms, such as helicopters.
5.4. Qualifications.
The findings in this study are a function of the fixed parameters that
were used. Especially important in this respect were the duration for target
exposures and the speed of the moving target. These had to be established in
preliminary experimentation to provide a range of hit probabilities that would
be useful in evaluating the weapon configurations. Essentially, this meant
that hit probabilities would have to be high enough using the standard
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configuration and procedure to permit the bracketing sights to be better or
worse. As it turned out, overall, single-shot, hit probabilities were near
50 percent in the two experiments, where the variance is the greatest for data
that are collected as proportions. This permitted a good separation of rela-
tive differences among the sight configurations. Obviously, if the targets
were impossible to hit or so easy to hit that misses were infrequent, no
differences could have been demonstrated.
5.5. Methodology.
Finally, it should be noted that a carefully conducted human activity
analysis established the critical features that required aiding to improve
pointing fire. The steps used in this study to analyze the problem, develop
solutions, and field test the resulting man-machine system in a realistic
setting could be applied to any problem where there is the need to improve the
man-machine relationship. The military environment happens to provide many
problems of this nature, but the law-enforcement environment should also pro-
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